SCOTUS Copyright Judgements
Supreme Court of the United States has decided following cases under Copyright Law (The Copyright Act of 1790, The Copyright Act of 1976, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998) since its establishment on September 24, 1789 pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution 1787.| Citation | Case Title & Transcript | Issue/s Involved | Held by SCOTUS |
|---|---|---|---|
| No. 20–915 February 24, 2022 | Unicolours, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz , L.P | H&M sought judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Unicolors could not maintain an infringement suit because Unicolors knowingly included inaccurate information on its registration application, rendering its copyright registration invalid | Section 411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact; lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under §411(b)(1)(A)’s safe harbor. |
| No. 18–956 April 5, 2021 | GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC. | Whether Google’s copying constituted a permissible “fair use” of that material freeing Google from copyright liability. | Google’s copying of the Java SE API, which included only those lines of code that were needed to allow programmers to put their accrued talents to work in a new and transformative program, was a fair use of that material as a matter of law. |
| No. 18–1150 April 27, 2020 | Georgia Et Al. V. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. | Whether that protection extends to the annotations contained in Georgia’s official annotated code. | The Copyright Act grants monopoly protection for “original works of authorship.” 17 U. S. C. §102(a). Under the government edicts doctrine, officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of the works they create in the course of their official duties. The State of Georgia has one official code—the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA). That Code includes the text of every Georgia statute currently in force, as well as a set of non-binding annotations that appear beneath each statutory provision. The OCGA annotations are ineligible for copyright protection. |
| No. 18–877 March 23, 2020 | Allen Et Al. V. Cooper, Governor of North Carolina, Et Al. | Whether Congress had authority to abrogate the States’ immunity | Congress lacked authority to abrogate the States’ immunity from copyright infringement suits in the CRCA |
| No. 17–1625 March 4, 2019 | Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. | The question presented in this case is whether the Copyright Act’s reference to “full costs” authorizes a court to award litigation expenses beyond the six categories of “costs” specified by Congress in the general costs statute. | The statutory text and our precedents establish that the answer is no. The term “full” is a term of quantity or amount; it does not expand the categories or kinds of expenses that may be awarded as “costs” under the general costs statute. In copyright cases, §505’s authorization for the award of “full costs” therefore covers only the six categories specified in the general costs statute, codified at §§1821 and 1920. We reverse in relevant part the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
| No. 17–571 March 4, 2019 | Fourth-Estate-Vs. Wallstreet.com | Is Copyright Registration Mandatory for an infringement suit? The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that “registration . . . has [not] been made” under §411(a) until the Copyright Office registers a copyright. | the Copyright Act safeguards copyright owners, irrespective of registration, by vesting them with exclusive rights upon creation of their works and prohibiting infringement from that point forward. If infringement occurs before a copyright owner applies for registration, that owner may eventually recover damages for the past infringement, as well as the infringer’s profits. §504. She must simply apply for registration and receive the Copyright Office’s decision on her application before instituting suit. Once the Register grants or refuses registration, the copyright owner may also seek an injunction barring the infringer from continued violation of her exclusive rights and an order requiring the infringer to destroy infringing materials. we conclude that “registration . . . has been made” within the meaning of 17 U. S. C. §411(a) not when an application for registration is filed, but when the Register has registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application. |
| No. 15–866 March 22, 2017 | Star Athletica, LLC V. Varsity Brands, Inc., et al. | Useful articles; Whether graphics could be“identified separately” and were “capable of existing independently”of the uniforms under §101. | “A feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article, and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated.” |
| 573 U.S. No. 13–461 June 25, 2014 | American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.V. Aereo, Inc. | Public performance; “Whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes this exclusive right by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air” | “We conclude that it does. The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the“exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U. S. C. §106(4). The Act’s Transmit Clause defines that exclusive right as including the right to “transmit or otherwise communicate a performance. . . of the [copyrighted] work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.” §101.” |
| 572 U.S. No. 12–1315 May 19, 2014 | Petrella V. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. | Laches | “Laches, we hold, cannot be invoked to preclude adjudication of a claim for damages brought within the three-yearwindow. As to equitable relief, in extraordinary circumstances, laches may bar at the very threshold the particular relief requested by the plaintiff” |
| 568 U.S. 133 S. Ct. 1351 No. 11–697 March 19, 2013 | Kirtsaeng V. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. | First-sale doctrine | “The “first sale” doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted worklawfully made abroad.” |
| 565 U.S. 132 S. Ct. 873 No. 10–545 January 18, 2012 | Golan V. Holder | Restoration of copyright in public domain works | “Section 514 does not exceed Congress’ authority under the Copyright Clause.” Challenge to Uruguay Round Agreements Act; held Constitution gives broad discretion to Congress to decide how best to promote the "progress of science and the useful arts", including restoring copyright in public domain works." |
| 562 U.S. 136 S.Ct. 445 No. 15-232 (R46-003). November 6, 2015 | Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp. | First-sale doctrine; The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that held that in copyright law, the first-sale doctrine does not act as a defense to claims of infringing distribution and importation for unauthorized sale of authentic, imported watches that bore a design registered in the Copyright Office. | “Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States was granted on April 19, 2010 however one Justice did not participate in the decision and the remaining Justices split 4–4, which means the Court affirms the Ninth Circuit's decision which carried no precedential weight, and is contrasted with Kirtsaeng V. John Wiley & Sons, Inc..” |
| 559 U.S. 154 No. 08–103 Decided March 2, 2010 | Reed Elsevier, Inc. V. Muchnick | Registration; whether §411(a) deprives federal courts of subject-matter juris-diction over infringement claims involving unregistered copyrights | “Section 411(a)’s registration requirement is a precondition to filing a copyright infringement claim. A copyright holder’s failure to comply with that requirement does not restrict a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction over infringement claims involving unregistered works.” Settlement of copyright infringement claims relating to an electronic database.” |
| 545 U.S. 913 No. 04 - 480 June 27, 2005 | Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. V. Grokster, Ltd. | Discovery revealed that billions of files are shared across peer-to-peer networks each month. Respondents are aware that users employ their software primarily to download copyrighted files. Respondents promoted and marketed themselves as Napster alternatives. They receive no revenue from users, but, instead, generate income by selling advertising space. | "One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses.(a) The tension between the competing values of supporting creativity through copyright protection and promoting technological innovation by limiting infringement liability is the subject of this case." |
| 539 U.S. 23 No. 02-428 June 2, 2003 | Dastar Corp. V. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. | Intersection of TM law with public domain works | Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not prevent the unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work. |
| 537 U.S. 186 No. 01–618 January 15, 2003 | Eldred v. Ashcroft | Term Extension; constitutionality of the CTEA against the backdrop of Congress’ previous exercises of its authority under the Copyright Clause; challenges the CTEA’s constitutionality under both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. | "The Nation’s first copyright statute, enacted in 1790, provided a federal copyright term of 14 years from the date of publication, renewable for an additional 14 years if the author survived the first term. Congress expanded the federal copyright term to 42 years in 1831 and to 56 years in 1909 In 1976, Congress altered the method for computing federal copyright terms. 1976 Act §§302–304. For works created by identified natural persons, the 1976 Act pro-vided that federal copyright protection would run from the work’s creation, not—as in the 1790, 1831, and 1909 Acts—its publication; protection would last until 50 years after the author’s death. §302(a). In these respects, the 1976 Act aligned United States copyright terms with the then-dominant international standard adopted under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-tic Works. See H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, p. 135 (1976). For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, the 1976 Act provided a term of 75 years from publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expired first. The CTEA does not violate the “limited Times” restriction of the Copyright Clause because the CTEA’s terms, though longer than the 1976 Act’s terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore fit within Congress’ discretion. The court also held that “there are no First Amendment rights to use the copy-righted works of others.” |
| 533 U.S. 483 No. 00-201 June 25, 2001 | New York Times Co. v. Tasini | Collective works | “Freelance journalists did not grant electronic republication rights for collective work. “Section 201(c) does not authorize the copying at issue here. The Publishers are not sheltered by §201(c) because the Databases reproduce and distribute articles standing alone and not in context, not "as part of that particular collective work" to which the author contributed, "as part of ... any revision" thereof, or "as part of ... any later collective work in the same series." |
| 523 U.S. 340 No. 96-1768 March 31, 1998 | Feltner V. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. | Right to Jury Trial on Statutory Damages | Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in a copyright infringement case |
| 523 U.S. 135 No. 96-1470 March 9, 1998. | Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. | Reimportation; Whether the right granted by § 602(a) is also limited by §§ 107 through 120. More narrowly, the question is whether the "first sale" doctrine endorsed in § 109(a) is applicable to imported copies. | "First-sale doctrine applies to reimported goods; the words "lawfully made under this title" in the "first sale" provision, 17 U. S. C. § 109(a), must mean "lawfully made in the United States"); see generally P. Goldstein, Copyright § 16.0, pp. 16:1-16:2 (2d ed. 1998) ("Copyright protection is territorial. The rights granted by the United States Copyright Act extend no farther than the nation's borders." |
| 516 U.S. 233 No. 94-2003 January 16, 1996 | Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc. | Copyrightability of software program interfaces; Issue at court of Appeal: Whether a computer menu command hierarchy is copyrightable subject matter. In particular, we must decide whether, as the district court held, plaintiff-appellee Lotus Development Corporation's copyright in Lotus 1-2-3, a computer spreadsheet program, was infringed by defendant-appellant Borland International, Inc., when Borland copied the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy into its Quattro and Quattro Pro computer spreadsheet programs | "Per Curiam. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is affirmed by an equally divided Court. The Court of Appeal Held: “question is not whether Borland should prevail but on what basis. Various avenues might be traveled, but the main choices are between holding that the menu is not protectable by copyright and devising a new doctrine that Borland's use is privileged. No solution is perfect and no intermediate appellate court can make the final choice.” |
| 510 U.S. 569 No. 92-1292 March 7, 1994 | Campbell V. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. | Fair use in Commercial Parody | “Commercial parody can be fair use. “Live Crew's commercial parody may be a fair use within the meaning of 107. Pp. 4-25. (a) Section 107, which provides that "the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism [or] comment . . . is not an infringement . . .," continues the common law tradition of fair use adjudication, and requires case-by-case analysis, rather than bright-line rules. The statutory examples of permissible uses provide only general guidance.” |
| 510 U.S. 517 No. 92-1750 March 1, 1994 | John C. Fogerty, Petitioner V. Fantasy, Inc. | Attorney's fees | Attorney's fees in copyright litigation may be awarded to successful defendants, as well as to successful plaintiffs |
| 499 U.S. 340 No. 89-1909 March 27, 1991 | Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. | Copyrightability of Facts and Idea/Expression Dichotomy | “Affirmed the need for a minimal amount of creativity before a work is copyrightable. "Sweat of the brow" alone is not sufficient to bestow copyright…This principle, known as the idea expression or fact-expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship.” |
| 495 U.S. 207 No. 88-2102 April 24, 1990 | Stewart v. Abend | Derivative works | "Rights of the successor of a copyright interest. “The distribution and publication of a derivative work during the copyright renewal term of a preexisting work incorporated into the [495 U.S. 207, 208] derivative work infringes the rights of the owner of the pre-existing work where the author of that work agreed to assign the rights in the renewal term to the derivative work's owner but died before the commencement of the renewal period and the statutory successor does not assign the right to use the pre-existing work to the owner of the derivative work.” |
| 490 U.S. 730 No. 88-293 June 5, 1989 | Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid | Work made for hire | “To determine whether a work is a "work made for hire" within the 101 definition, a court should first apply general common law of agency principles to ascertain whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent contractor, and, depending upon the outcome, should then apply either 101(1) or 101(2). Although the Act nowhere defines "employee," "employment," or related terms, it must be inferred that Congress meant them in their settled, common-law sense, since nothing in the text of the work for hire provisions indicates that those terms are used to describe anything other than the conventional relation of employer and employee. On the contrary, Congress' intent to incorporate agency law definitions is suggested by 101(1)'s use of the term "scope of employment," a widely used agency law term of art.” |
| 473 U.S. 207 No. 84-589 June 28, 1985 | Dowling. v. United States | Criminal law impact of infringement | Copyright infringement is not theft, conversion, or fraud; illegally made copies are not stolen goods. |
| 471 U.S. 539 No. 83-1632 May 20, 1985 | Harper & Row V. Nation Enterprises | Fair use in excerpts; to what extent the "fair use" provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 sanctions the unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure's unpublished manuscript | "The interest served by republication of a public figure's account of an event is not sufficient to permit nontransformative Fair use. “The Nation's article was not a "fair use" sanctioned by 107. Pp. 542-569. (a) In using generous verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished expression to lend authenticity to its account of the forthcoming memoirs, The Nation effectively arrogated to itself the right of first publication, an important marketable subsidiary right. (b) Though the right of first publication, like other rights enumerated in 106, is expressly made subject to the fair use provisions of 107, fair use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case. The nature of the interest at stake is highly relevant to whether a given use is fair. The unpublished nature of a work isa key, though not necessarily determinative, factor tending to negate a defense of fair use. And under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.” |
| 469 U.S. 153 No. 83-1153 January 8, 1985 | Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder | Assignment of royalties under the Copyright Act; | “Assignment of royalties under the Copyright Act; Petitioner is entitled pursuant to § 304(c)(6)(A) to a share of the royalty income in dispute under the terms of the author's grant to petitioner in 1940. A consistent reading of the word "grant" in the text of § 304(c)(6)(A) encompasses that grant. Nothing in the legislative history or the language of the statute indicates that Congress intended to draw a distinction between authorizations to prepare derivative works that are based on a single direct grant and those that are based on successive grants. Rather, the consequences of a termination that § 304 authorizes do not apply to derivative works that are protected by the § 304(c)(6)(A) exception. The boundaries of that exception are defined by reference to the scope of the privilege that had been authorized under the terminated grant and by reference to the time the derivative works were prepared. The record companies' derivative works involved in this case are unquestionably within those boundaries.” |
| 464 U.S. 417 No. 81-1687 January 17, 1984 | Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. | Secondary liability and fair use in home recordings | “The sale of the VTR's to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondents' Copyrights.” |
| 441 U.S. 1 No. 77-1578 April 17, 1979 | Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System | Antitrust and copyright collective rights organizations; whether the issuance by ASCAP and BMI to CBS of blanket licenses to copyrighted musical compositions at fees negotiated by them is price-fixing per se unlawful under the antitrust laws. | “ The issuance by ASCAP and BMI of blanket licenses does not constitute price fixing per se unlawful under the antitrust laws” |
| 420 U.S. 376 No. 73-1279 February 25, 1975 | Williams & Wilkins Co. V. United States | Fair use in photocopies; Whether defendant has infringed plaintiff's copyrights in certain of its medical journals by making unauthorized photocopies of articles from those periodicals. | PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Court below held: “the United States free of liability in the particular situation” |
| 422 U.S. 151 No. 74-452 June 17, 1975 | Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken | Public performance of radio broadcasts in business establishments | Receiving a radio broadcast of a licensed work does not constitute a "performance". This effectively overruled Buck v. Jewel-LaSalle Realty Co. (1931) “if an unlicensed use of a copyrighted work does not conflict with an "exclusive" right conferred by the statute, it is no infringement of the holder's rights. No license is required by the Copyright Act, for example, to sing a copyrighted lyric in the shower.” |
| 415 U.S. 394 No. 72-1628 March 4, 1974 | Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting | Public performance of broadcast television; Whether defendants had infringed their copyrights by intercepting broadcast transmissions of copyrighted material and rechanneling these programs through various community antenna television (CATV) systems to paying subscribers. | Receiving a television broadcast does not constitute a "performance" “new functions of CATV systems - program origination, sale of commercials, and interconnection with other CATV systems ..may allow the systems to compete more effectively with the broadcasters for the television market, do not convert the entire CATV operation, regardless of distance from the broadcasting station, into a "broadcast function," thus subjecting the CATV operators to copyright infringement liability, but are extraneous to a determination of such liability, since in none of these functions is there any nexus with the CATV operators' reception and rechanneling of the broadcasters' copyrighted materials. ..The importation of "distant" signals from one community into another does not constitute a "performance" under the Copyright Act.” |
| 412 U.S. 546 No. 71-1192 June 18, 1973 | Goldstein v. California | Federal pre-emption of state criminal copyright law; Certiorari was granted to review petitioners' conviction under a California statute making it a criminal offense to "pirate" recordings produced by others. | “ Until and unless Congress takes further action with respect to recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, the California statute may be enforced against acts of piracy such as those which occurred in the present case.” |
| 392 U.S. 390 No. 618 June 17, 1968 | Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. | Public performance of broadcast television | Receiving a television broadcast (of a licensed work) does not constitute a "performance" “With due regard to changing technology,we hold that the petitioner did not under that law "perform" the respondent's copyrighted works.” |
| 214 April 18, 1960 | Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc. | Whether by statute the renewal rights accrue to the executor in spite of a prior assignment. | “They are among those to whom 24 has granted the renewal right, irrespective of whether the author in his lifetime has or has not made any assignment of it.” |
| 356 U.S. 43 No. 90 March 17, 1958 | Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc. | Fair use in parody; Is a charge of copyright infringement, where the defendant has taken a substantial part of the copyrighted work, defeated by the fact that the appropriated material was used in or as part of a burlesque or parody of the copyright work, rather than in or as part of a serious or independent work? Stated in another way, is a burlesque, which takes a substantial part of a copyrighted motion picture, a fair use? | PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Below court Held: The 1952 and 1953 productions are very alike. Both infringe plaintiff's copyright. Thus the threatened showing of the 1953 impounded film is an equivalent of another showing of the 1952 production. |
| 351 U.S. 570 No. 529 June 11, 1956 | De Sylva v. Ballentine | Renewal terms and beneficiaries | “ Under 255 of the California Probate Code, an illegitimate child who is acknowledged by his father, by a writing signed in the presence of a witness, is entitled to inherit his father's estate as well as his mother's (although he may not be legitimate for all purposes), and that is sufficient for the purposes of the copyright Act.” |
| 347 U.S. 201 No. 228 March 8, 1954 | Mazer v. Stein | Copyrightability of sculpture and Idea/Expression Dichotomy | Extended copyright protection to functional art. Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; “protection is given only to the expression of the idea - not the idea itself. Thus, in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 , the Court held that a copyrighted book on a peculiar system of bookkeeping was not infringed by a similar book using a similar plan which achieved similar results where the alleged infringer made a different arrangement of the columns and used different headings. The distinction is illustrated in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151, when the court speaks of two men, each a perfectionist, independently making maps of the same territory. Though the maps are identical, each may obtain the exclusive right to make copies of his own particular map, and yet neither will infringe the other's copyright. Likewise a copyrighted directory is not infringed by a similar directory which is the product of independent work. 40 The copyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention - conferring only "the sole right of multiplying copies." 41 Absent copying there can be no infringement of copyright. 42 Thus, respondents may not exclude others from using statuettes of human figures in table lamps; they may only prevent use of copies of their statuettes as such or as incorporated in some other article. Regulation 202.8, supra, makes clear that artistic articles are protected in "form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects." See Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227, 231. right of multiplying copies." 41 Absent copying there can be no infringement of copyright. 42 Thus, respondents may not exclude others from using statuettes of human figures in table lamps; they may only prevent use of copies of their statuettes as such or as incorporated in some other article. Regulation 202.8, supra, makes clear that artistic articles are protected in "form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects." See Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227, 231.” |
| 344 U.S. 227 No. 42 December 22, 1952 | F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc. | Election of remedies (Statutory Damages) | Court may grant statutory damages, even when infringer proves its gross profits were less than the statutory award. Judges granted wide latitude when determining legal remedies based on the facts of the case. |
| 334 U.S. 131 No. 79 to 86 May 3, 1948 | United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. | Antitrust; Also known as Hollywood Antitrust Case of 1948; Whether the producer defendants had attempted to monopolize and had monopolized the production of motion pictures. | The existing distribution scheme was in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States, which prohibit certain exclusive dealing arrangements. |
| 318 U.S. 643 No. 327. April 5, 1943 | Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons | Renewal terms and assignment | “ In addition to all other books and pamphlets relevant to our problem, we have consulted all of the twenty treatises on the American law of copyright available at the Library of Congress. Eight of these state, without qualification, that an author can effectively agree to assign his renewal interest before it has been secured; two state the rule with some reservations; ten are either silent or ambiguous. And the forms of assignment of copyright in treatises and standard form-books generally contain a provision designed to transfer the renewal interest. The available evidence indicates, therefore, that renewal interests of authors have been regarded as assignable both before and after the Copyright Act of 1909. To hold at this late date that, as a matter of law, such interests are not assignable would be to reject all relevant aids to construction. …Copyright Act of 1909 does not nullify agreements by authors to assign their renewal interests” |
| 309 U.S. 390 No. 482 March 25, 1940 | Sheldon V. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. | Damages | “In the case of an unauthorized adaptation, court may elect to award only a portion of an infringer's profits to the plaintiff. The Copyright Act in Section 25(b)1 provides that an infringer shall be liable- '(b) To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement, ... or in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, ...'. We agree with petitioners that the 'in lieu' clause is not applicable here, as the profits have been proved and the only question is as to their apportionment.” |
| 306 U.S. 30 No. 222 January 30, 1939 | Washingtonian Pub. Co. V. Pearson | Requirements under copyright law | “The right to sue under the Act for infringement is not lost by mere delay in depositing copies of the copyrighted work…..A suit to enjoin the infringement and to recover damages (from the date of publication of the infringing work) was maintainable under the Copyright Act of 1909.” |
| 286 U.S. 123 No. 118 May 16, 1932 | Fox Film Corp V. Doyal | State government taxation of copyright royalties | "We are of the opinion that no controlling distinction can be based, in the case of copyrights, upon the character of the right granted...royalties from copyrights stand in the same position as royalties from the use of patent rights, and what we have said as to the purposes of the government in relation to copyrights applies as well, mutatis mutandis, to patents which are granted under the same constitutional authority to promote the progress of science and useful arts.” |
| 283 U.S. 191 No. 138 April 13, 1931 | Buck V. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. | 'Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making available to his guests, through the instrumentality of a radio receiving set and loud speakers installed in his hotel and under his control and for the entertainment of his guests, the hearing of a copyrighted musical composition which has beenbroadcast from a radio transmitting station, constitute a performance of such composition within the meaning of 17 USC Sec. 1(e)?' | “The question certified, is answered yes.” A hotel operator which provided headphones connected to a centrally controlled radio receiver was guilty of copyright infringement, because "reception of a radio broadcast and its translation into audible sound is not a mere audition of the original program. It is essentially a reproduction." NB: Gene Buck, plaintiff, was president of ASCAP. |
| 248 U.S. 215 No. 221 December 23, 1918 | International News Service V. Associated Press | Copyright of News and News articles | “A news article in a newspaper may be copyrighted under the Act of March 4, 1909, but news, as such, is not copyrightable…As against the public, any special interest of the producer of uncopyrighted news matter is lost upon the first publication..But one who gathers news at pains and expense, for the purpose of lucrative publication, may be said to have a quasi-property in the results of his enterprise as against a rival in the same business, and the appropriation of those results at the expense and to the damage of the one and for the profit of the other is unfair competition against which equity will afford relief.” “The first company and its members, as against the second company, had an equitable quasi property in the news, even after the early publications; that the use made of it by the second company not as a mere basis for independent investigation, but by substantial appropriation for its own gain and at the expense and to the damage of their enterprise, amounted to unfair competition which should be enjoined irrespective of the false pretense involved in rewriting articles and in distributing the news without mentioning the source, for this, while accentuating the wrong, was not of its essence…. Complainant was not debarred from relief upon the ground of unclean hands by the fact that, following a practice engaged in by the defendant also and by news agencies generally, it had used the defendant's news items, when published, as "tips" for investigations, the results of which it sold.” |
| 242 U.S. 591 No. 427, 433 January 22, 1917 | Herbert V. Shanley Co. | Whether the performance of a copyrighted musical composition in a restaurant or hotel without charge for admission to hear it infringes the exclusive right of the owner of the copyright to perform the work publicly for profit. | Hotels & restaurants that perform music must compensate composers, even if the venue is not separately charging patrons to hear the music. “If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance where money is taken at the door, they are very imperfectly protected. Performances not different in kind from those of the defendants could be given that might compete with and even destroy the success of the monopoly that the law intends the plaintiffs to have. It is enough to say that there is no need to construe the statute so narrowly. The defendants' performances are not eleemosynary. They are part of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is attributed to a particular item which those present are expected to order is not important. It is true that the music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which probably could be got cheaper elsewhere. The object is a repast in surroundings that to people having limited powers of conversation, or disliking the rival noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to be had from eating a silent meal. If music did not pay, it would be given up. If it pays, it pays out of the public's pocket. Whether it pays or not, the purpose of employing it is profit, and that is enough.” |
| 229 U.S. 1 No. 951 May 26, 1913 | Bauer & Cie. V. O'Donnell | 'Did the acts of the appellee, in retailing at less than the price fixed in said notice, original packages of 'Sanatogen,' purchased of jobbers, as aforesaid, constitute infringement of appellants' patent?' May a patentee by notice limit the price at which future retail sales of the patented article may be made, such article being in the hands of a retailer by purchase from a jobber who has paid to the agent of the patentee the full price asked for the article sold? | “The copyright act, secures to an author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of books, maps, charts, or dramatic or musical compositions, the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending them. While that statute differs from the patent statute in terms and in the subject-matter intended to be protected…In the case of patents the exclusive right to vend the invention or discovery is added to the like right to make and use the subject-matter of the grant, and in the case of copyrights the sole right of multiplying and reproducing books and other compositions is coupled with the similar right of 'vending the same.' So far as the use of the terms 'vend' and 'vending' is concerned, the protection intended to be secured is substantially identical. The sale of a patented article is not essentially different from the sale of a book. …Protection in the exclusive right to sell is aimed at in both instances, and the terms used in the statutes are to all intents the same. It is apparent that the principal difference in the enactments lies in the presence of the word 'use' in the patent statute and its absence in the copyright law. An inventor has not only the exclusive right to make and vend his invention or discovery, but he has the like right to use it; and when a case comes fairly within the grant of the right to use, that use should be protected by all means properly within the scope of the statute" |
| 223 U.S. 424 No. 44 February 19, 1912 | Ferris V. Frohman | Publication and Public Performance | “The public representation of a dramatic composition, not printed and published, does not deprive the owner of his common-law right, save by operation of statute. At common law, the public performance of the play is not an abandonment of it to the public use.” |
| 222 U.S. 55 No. 26 November 13, 1911 | Kalem Co.V. Harper Bros. | Derivative works and Secondary liability; Whether the public exhibition of these moving pictures infringed any rights under the copyright law. | “ Moving pictures may be used for dramatizing a novel, when the photographs are used in that way, they are used to infringe a right which the statute reserves.” |
| 214 U.S. 236 No. 160 May 24, 1909 | Bong V. Campbell Art Co. | Assignment rights and territorial jurisdiction. | The assignee of an author of a painting is not entitled to copyright unless the author is a citizen of a country to the citizens of which reciprocal copyright privileges have actually been extended by proclamation of the President in conformity with § 13 of the Act of March 3, 1891. The fact that the assignee is a citizen of such a country does not entitle him to copyright. An assignee within the meaning of the copyright statute is one who receives a transfer not necessarily of the painting, but of the right to multiply copies thereof, and such right depends not only upon the statute, but is derived also from the painter, who must have the right to copyright in order to assign it. A citizen of a country not in copyright relations with the United States under § 13 of the act of 1891 is not entitled to avail of the copyright. |
| 210 U.S. 339 No. 176 June 1, 1908 | Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus | does the sole right to vend (named in § 4952) secure to the owner of the copyright the right, after a sale of the book to a purchaser, to restrict future sales of the book at retail, to the right to sell it at a certain price per copy, because of a notice in the book that a sale at a different price will be treated as an infringement, which notice has been brought home to one undertaking to sell for less than the named sum? | “There are differences between the patent and the copyright statutes in the extent of the protection granted by them, and the rights of a patentee are not necessarily to be applied by analogy to those claiming under copyright. At common law, an author had a property in his manuscript, and might have redress against anyone undertaking to publish it without his authority. Copyright property under the federal law is wholly statutory, and depends upon the rights created under acts of Congress passed in pursuance of authority conferred by § 8 of Art. I of the federal Constitution.” “The sole right to vend granted by § 4952, Rev.Stat., does not secure to the owner of the copyright the right to qualify future sales by his vendee or to limit or restrict such future sales at a specified price, and a notice in the book that a sale at a different price will be treated as an infringement is ineffectual as against one not bound by contract or license agreement.” |
| 209 U.S. 1 No. 110 February 24, 1908 | White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company | Public performance right in music | Reproduction of the sounds of musical instruments playing music for which copyright granted not a violation of the copyright. |
| 208 U.S. 260 No. 129 February 3, 1908 | United Dictionary Co. V. G. & C. Merriam Co. | Whether the omission of notice of the American copyright from the English publication, with the assent of the appellee, destroyed its rights? | The statute does not require notice of the American copyright on books published abroad and sold only for use there |
| 188 U.S. 239 No. 117 February 2, 1903 | Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Company | Copyrightability of commercial art. | Copyright protection of illustrations made for advertisements; “The clause of the Constitution giving Congress power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective works and discoveries, does not, as I think, embrace a mere advertisement of a circus.” |
| 128 U.S. 244 No. 45 November 19, 1888 | Banks V. Manchester | Copyrightability of laws | “The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute. Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35. In Wheaton v. Peters, at p. 668, it was said by this court, that it was "unanimously of opinion that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right." What a court, or a judge thereof, cannot confer on a reporter as the basis of a copyright in him, they cannot confer on any other person or on the State.” |
| 111 U.S. 53 March 17, 1884 | Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony | Copyrightability of photography | Extended copyright protection to photography. “author' involves originating, making, producing, as the inventive or mastermind, the thing which is to be protected, whether it be a drawing, or a painting, or a photograph,… photography is to be treated for the purposes of the act as an art, and the author is the man who really represents, creates, or gives effect to the idea, fancy, or imagination.” |
| 101 U.S. 99 1880 | Baker V. Selden | Idea/Expression Dichotomy; Whether, in obtaining the copyright of his books, he secured the exclusive right to the use of the system or method of bookkeeping which the said books are intended to illustrate and explain. | Idea-expression divide; differences between copyright & patent law; “Mere copyright of Selden's book did not confer upon him the exclusive right to make and use account books, ruled and arranged as designated by him and described and illustrated in said book” |
| 100 U.S. 82 1879 | Trade-Mark Cases | Constitutional basis for Trademark regulation | Copyright Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate trademarks |
| 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 1834 | Wheaton V. Peters | Copyrightability/Common law Copyright / Formalities | There is no such thing as common law copyright and one must observe the formalities to secure a copyright. |
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